Structural Change in Russian Transition by Gregory, Paul R. & Lazarev, Valery
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Discussion Papers Economic Growth Center 
10-1-2004 
Structural Change in Russian Transition 
Paul R. Gregory 
Valery Lazarev 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series 
Recommended Citation 
Gregory, Paul R. and Lazarev, Valery, "Structural Change in Russian Transition" (2004). Discussion Papers. 
904. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/904 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an 
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, 
please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
P.O. Box 208629
New Haven, CT 06520-8269
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/
CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 896
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN RUSSIAN TRANSITION
Paul R. Gregory
University of Houston
and
Valery Lazarev
University of Houston
October 2004
Notes: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussions and
critical comments.
This research was conducted while Valery Lazarev was visiting the Economic Growth
Center, Yale University.  Financial and technical support from the Economic Growth Center
is gratefully acknowledged.
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network
electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=613401
An index to papers in the Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper Series is located at: 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/research.htm
Structural Change in Russian Transition
by Paul R. Gregory and Valery Lazarev
Abstract
This paper examines structural change in the Russian economy in 1990-2001, as measured
by the changing composition of output and consumption, using international panel data sets as a
frame of reference.  It calculates a series of indexes to determine the extent to which the Russian
economy is converging towards market economies.  Although the Russian structure of output is
becoming increasingly similar to that of upper-middle and the lower tier of high-income countries,
the structure of Russian manufacturing is inconsistent with its income level and the extent of labor
reallocation remains inadequate.  Russia’s pattern of consumption remains distorted due to the
incomplete price liberalization.
Keywords: Post-Communist Transition, Value Added, Labor Productivity, Composition of GDP,
Price Distortions.
JEL classification: E20, P20.
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Planned socialist economies practiced centralized distribution of resources according to the 
preferences of the dictatorial government (“planners’ preferences”). 1 The rigidity of material balance 
planning (“planning from the achieved level”) ensured that deviations from market-like resource 
allocations persisted, and relative autarky diverted resource allocation from comparative advantage. 
Consequently, the patterns of resource allocation (as observed in the structure of GDP, consumer 
budgets, foreign trade, and so on) in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe differed significantly from 
those of market economies at similar levels of development. Russia’s (the USSR’s) deviations from 
“normal” structures of market economies were substantial, such as the greater shares of heavy industry, 
the low shares of services, the high shares of food, consumption, and the underutilization of foreign 
trade (Kuznets, 1963; Gregory, 1970; Ofer, 1973; Schroeder and Edwards, 1981). These structural 
distortions contributed to the stagnation and decline of the planned economies (Desai, 1987; Rosefielde, 
1998; Gregory and Stuart, 2001). Transitional economies, including Russia, started with initial 
conditions inherited from the their socialist past, which would be expected to be removed in the course 
of a successful transition. The larger the deviations from normal patterns, the more difficult the 
transition. Indeed, transition “success” varied inversely with the proximity to and duration of the Soviet 
core model (Stuart and Panayotopouolos, 1999). 
 The pace of change in Russia, both structural and institutional, has been rapid since 1991 
(World Bank, 1995; Tabata, 1996; Schroeder, 1998; Gregory and Stuart, 2001), but these changes must 
be evaluated in a comparative context. One such comparative study was recently completed for 
transition economies using a cross section of market economies to establish benchmarks for changes in 
the distribution of labor.2 This paper provides a more comprehensive comparative analysis for Russia 
                                                     
1 The term was introduced by Abram Bergson, See, for example: Bergson (1964). 
2 World Bank (2004) is a “benchmarking” study of Russia’s changing structure of value added, broken down into 
four major sectors. 
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alone using a large panel data set of market economies as a reference point. We study Russian structural 
changes not only of labor force, but also of output, relative productivity, and consumption.  
We study Russian structural change from 1990 to 2001 to determine the extent and speed with 
which the structure of the Russian economy is converging (or not) towards other country groups ranked 
according to income levels. This exercise provides a measure of transition “success” which is grounded 
in quantitative rather than subjective indicators, such as those of the EBRD.  Second, this paper points 
the way to future sectoral growth patterns under the assumption that remaining structural distortions 
will continue to be removed.  Third, it indicates the type of market economy towards which Russia is 
moving, given the great uncertainty as to the Russian economy’s “final” shape and form. 
 
RUSSIAN DATA AND TRENDS 
  We use data from the period 1990 to 2001 to study Russian structural change. The Soviet 
Union was disbanded in December of 1991 and the liberalization of prices began in January of 1992. 
Therefore, the years prior to 1992 establish the base point from which transition began.  The data covers 
Russia’s transition recession (or depression) from 1992 to 1997 and the resumption of growth that 
followed the currency crisis of August 1998. Thus, our data set captures too few years of economic 
growth to judge its long-term pattern. 
 The Russian data are calculated from Goskomstat (Russian Statistical Agency) publications. 
Since the early 1990s, Goskomstat has had to change its accounting system from net material product to 
the internationally-accepted System of National Accounts.3 In the turbulent early years of 
transformation, Goskomstat produced some contradictory figures, and added significant imputations for 
                                                     
3 For methodological explanations, see Goskomstat Rossii (1995; 2003). The transition created problems with 
respect to measurement of depreciation (how rapidly to write off obsolete Soviet-era equipment), profits (which 
now vary often dramatically by industry rather than being percentage add-ons to prices), and activities (such as 
business services, small business, and real estate) that did not even exist in Soviet times. The hyperinflation of the 
early 1990s complicates value calculations. 
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uncounted wages and for small and underground businesses.4  We have chosen to use primarily current 
price data, which combines price and real resource movements, because economic decisions are based 
upon prevailing prices, not constant prices. We had to largely recalculate current-price data for the 
period 1990 to 1995, but the data starting in 1995 appears to be calculated on a consistent basis.  
Goskomstat provides little data on the breakdown of industry, broadly defined to include 
mining and electricity. We therefore had to compile our own breakdowns of industry, usually using the 
more detailed annual input-output tables of Goskomstat.5  The Russian output data used in this study 
are summarized in Tables A1 to A3, Appendix 1. Their derivation is explained in a more detailed 
working paper available from the authors. We do not adjust the value added shares to raise the energy 
shares and reduce the trade shares as argued by a recent World Bank study. Our reasons are explained 
in Appendix 2. 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION (VALUE ADDED AND LABOR FORCE) 
Table A1 provides our value added, labor force, and relative productivity data organized into 23 
sectors in current (“basic”) prices (which adjust for indirect taxes, subsidies, and transportation and 
trade margins).  These data are combined into eight sectors in Table A2 and in Figure 1, which break 
the economy into “fuels” and the rest of industry (primarily manufacturing), agriculture and forestry, 
trade, transportation and communication, construction, transportation, trade, business services and 
public administration, health, science, education, and welfare, denoted as PA-HEAS – services 
traditionally offered by the state. Hence PA-HEAS serves as a measure of the size and scope of the state 
sector. It is extremely important that the sector definitions be identical for labor force and for output; 
otherwise, there can be large errors in the estimation of relative productivity (the value added share 
                                                     
4 Goskomstat began including  “unreported wages and salaries” starting in 1993 and raised the value of the capital 
stock much slower than inflation after 1991. Both practices affect the changes in value-added shares in the early 
1990s, but they seem like reasonable adjustments. Otherwise, we did not find significant methodological changes. 
5 Goskomstat Rossii (1995). 
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divided by the labor force share). Presumably errors would be greatest for narrowly defined sectors and 
least for broadly defined sectors. 
Figures 1A and 1B show that the changes in value added shares exceed the changes in labor 
force shares. This is an expected result in that labor force rigidities that would be prominent in the 
Russian case.6 Both manufacturing and agriculture experienced significant and immediate declines in 
value added shares (manufacturing’s was reversed briefly as an apparent consequence of the ruble 
devaluation in 1998), but agriculture’s share remained relatively stable since the mid 1990s after an 
initial plunge at the start of transition.  The generally rising (albeit not monotonically) sectors are trade, 
business services, and fuels. PA-HEAS experienced a substantial drop in the first two years as a 
consequence of the collapsing state budget, then increased, suggesting that the share of the state in 
economic activities has actually been rising. Construction and transportation maintained relatively 
stable shares.  
The employment shares of manufacturing and construction generally fell but less than their 
output shares, while agriculture’s and transportation’s labor shares remained remarkably stable. PA-
HEAS’s employment shares also rose, but the most dramatic increase in employment shares was in 
trade, suggesting a “real” relative movement of resources into trading activities. New market-oriented 
service sectors clearly led the expansion with banking and insurance increasing almost four-fold in ten 
years and the small real estate sector doubling in size every two years. This employment growth in 
services was fed largely by movement from industry and from traditional services. The resilience of 
employment in government and social services7 is surprising. The share of government employment 
increased from the low of 2.1% in 1992 to 5.0% in 2000 (Figure 2). The number of bureaucrats, 
                                                     
6 The extreme geographical concentration of industry, such as the large share of textile enterprises located in the 
Central Industrial Region or the resource-extracting industries located in remote Eastern regions, and the costs of 
labor mobility explain the inadequate re-allocation of labor. As Figure 1 shows, light industry’s output share fell 
from 19 percent to 2 percent, but it lost only about one half of its workers. At the same time, the tripling of the 
share of “fuels” sector was not nearly matched by modest increase in the share of employment. 
7 “State administration” (upravlenie) in terms used by Goskomstat. 
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according to some estimates, in Russia today is greater than in the Soviet period and their productivity 
is lower than in the Soviet period (Larina, 2001). Figure 2 confirms that government administration was 
the growth employment industry of the second half of the 1990s.  
The relative labor productivity chart (Figure 1C) divides sectors into those with higher or lower 
than average labor productivity  (where the economy average equals 100). Those sectors experiencing 
upsurges in relative productivity – business (commercial, information, financial) services, trade, and 
fuels made their major gains between 1990 and 1992, after which they either maintained their position 
(fuels), converged towards the average (trade), or declined to experience another surge after devaluation 
in 1998 (business services).  Business services, which had been absent from the planned economy, 
proved extremely productive when the transition began, but then declined with the level of real 
economic activity, only to surge again with the pickup in real economic activity. Notably manufacturing 
remained near the average throughout the period as did construction; while agriculture and PA-HEAS 
remained stuck below the average. The rising labor force share of PA-HEAS implies that the labor 
force in part reallocated inefficiently – to the activities whose relative productivity fell (from 62 percent 
to 44 percent of the economy average). 
Table A3 summarizes value added, labor force, and relative productivity for manufacturing sub 
sectors.  Figure 3A captures the dramatic change in manufacturing value added shares as the Russian 
economy began its transition. The shares of machinery and light industry (textiles and apparel) plunged 
in the first two to three years, after which they remained relatively stable. Conversely, the value added 
shares of fuels and electricity soared in the first few years of transition, after which the energy share 
depended on the world price of oil, and the electricity share dropped after 1998. The shares of metals 
remained relatively stable until the 1998 devaluation.  The manufacturing labor force shares (Figure 
3B) moved less than the value added shares. The declines in machinery’s and light industry’s labor 
force shares were most prominent among those sectors with declining employment shares. 
Trends in relative productivity within manufacturing (Figure 3C) show that, of those that were 
significantly above average in 1990, fuels and electricity’s relative productivities soared during the 
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early years of transition, with electricity eventually returning approximately to its initial position. Light 
industry fell from well-above-average productivity to the lowest productivity manufacturing sector. 
Other sectors generally maintained their initial positions throughout the transition near or below the 
economy average. 
In the Soviet period, light industry and food products were low-priority branches. Presumably, 
their shares of manufacturing would be expected to increase in the course of transition. The experiences 
of light industry and food were notably different.  Between 1991 and 1992, light industry’s share of 
value added collapsed from 19 percent to a remarkably low 2 percent, from which its share failed to 
recover. Its loss of employment share was also substantial but less dramatic resulting in a collapse of 
relative labor productivity in light industry.  Light industry dropped from being 77 percent above the 
economy-wide productivity average to being 20 percent of the average.  On the other hand, food 
manufacturing more-or-less held its own with a rising share of value added and of relative productivity 
starting in the mid 1990s as Russian food manufacturers began to compete more effectively with 
foreign imports. The collapse of light industry’s value added and labor force shares suggest an industry 
coddled by relatively high prices and shielded from foreign competition that collapsed when price were 
freed and the economy was opened. 
The Soviet heavy industry priority was not fully misplaced for an eventual open, market 
economy. The emphasis on fuels has generally served the Russian transition economy well, although 
the antiquated infrastructure and lack of technology make it relatively backward as compared to 
industrialized countries. With a low ruble exchange rate, Russian metals appear to be internationally 
competitive with the “right” exchange rate. The main burden of the Soviet past has been felt in 
machinery, whose relative productivity fell from 70 percent to a low of 50 percent of the economy 
average before staging a slight recovery to 55 percent. Indeed the major adjustments of both value 
added and labor force have been in the machinery sector, where re-allocations may have weeded out the 
lowest productivity machinery producers. 
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INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS: THE STRUCTURE OF OUTPUT 
 International comparisons shed light on the extent to which the Russian economy in the course 
of transition has become more like a market economy, and, if so, more like what type of market 
economy – a low middle-income country (which is where international organizations peg the current 
Russian economy), or a higher income country? When it is all over, will Russia be an affluent economy 
like industrialized Europe, will it be a troubled low to middle income country, such as Turkey, or will it 
be at the fringes of affluence, such as Greece or Portugal? 
To make such comparison, we use panel data on value added and labor force drawn from large 
databases, such as those of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Bank (World 
Bank Development Indicators). In Table A2, for example, we have recoded the Russian data to conform 
to that of the ILO. Unlike the Russian data, where we can calculate simultaneously value added, labor 
force, and relative productivity data, in international comparisons we must work with either value added 
or labor force distributions, and we have access to relative labor productivity only for a three-sector 
(industry, agriculture, services) breakdown.  
 
 Aggregate level (Industry, Agriculture and Services) 
The empirical literature has established patterns in the relationship between the level of 
economic development and certain structural parameters. In particular, the share of the service sector 
(both in terms of value added and employment) grows with per capita GDP in economies past the initial 
phase of industrialization. 8 Although this relationship holds for any group of countries (for the postwar 
period) including former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the trend for the socialist economies was 
significantly displaced with respect to the dominant pattern exhibited by the rest of the world. 
Moreover, the shares of agriculture and industry, especially heavy industry, in centrally planned 
economies were higher than elsewhere. In other words, these economies were lagging behind market 
economies in the rate of structural modernization.  
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Figure 4 shows the relationship between the level of development and the service sector as a 
share of the total employment for both transition and market economies at the start of transition (1990) 
and a decade into transition (2000). Trend lines are imposed for market and transition economies 
separately, which show that transitional economies as a group had smaller service sectors as of 1990. 
Although the slopes of the trend lines are essentially the same, the transitional-economy trend line is 
characterized by a downward shift.9 After a decade of transformation, the difference in the relationship 
had been removed on average, even though East and Central Asian transitional economies still fall 
below the general trend. The Russian economy, denoted by a larger gray square followed the general 
restructuring pattern. A typical centrally-planned economy with a deficient service sector in 1990, 
Russia becomes “normal” ten years later despite the decline of total output. Similar patterns of change 
characterize the contribution of the service sector to value added (not shown here). 
 
Table 1. The Structure of Value Added, Labor Force, and Relative Productivity, Russia and Country 
Groups (by income level) 
    Value added, % of total Employment, % of total 
Productivity index  
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1990 4.6 33.0 62.4 8.3 29.6 61.8 0.55 1.11 1.01 
2001 
H 
2.4 30.3 67.3 5.1 26.9 67.9 0.48 1.13 0.99 
1990 8.4 34.6 57.0 12.5 29.8 57.6 0.67 1.16 0.99 
2001 
LH 
3.9 33.9 62.2 8.8 27.4 63.6 0.45 1.24 0.98 
1990 8.6 39.4 52.0 18.2 26.4 54.4 0.47 1.50 0.96 
2001 
UM 
6.0 36.3 57.7 15.6 23.3 60.6 0.38 1.56 0.95 
1990 17.3 32.6 50.1 31.1 22.9 44.6 0.56 1.43 1.12 
1999 
LM 
13.9 31.3 54.8 30.4 20.8 48.8 0.46 1.50 1.12 
1990 CEE 14.0 45.1 40.8 20.2 40.2 39.3 0.69 1.12 1.04 
                                                                                                                                                                        
8 See, for example: Chenery et al. (1986). 
9 Regression equation for transitional economies, Ss = 12.3 ln (Y) - 73.5, differs significantly from the regression 
for market economies, Ss = 12.6 ln (Y) - 58.9, only in the intercept. The slopes do not differ significantly. In the 
equations above, Ss denotes the share of service sector in the total employment and Y denotes GDP per capita in 
1990 USD measured at purchasing power parity. 
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2000  7.3 33.1 59.7 12.6 31.0 56.5 0.58 1.07 1.06 
1990 16.5 48.6 34.9 13.9 40.1 41.0 1.19 1.21 0.85 
2001 
Russia 
7.0 37.8 55.2 13.0 31.6 55.4 0.54 1.20 1.00 
Notes: 1) H, UM, LM stand for high, upper-middle, and lower-middle income groups respectively as 
defined by World Bank. LH – “lower high” – is a lower subdivision of high-income group that includes 
countries such as Spain, Greece, and South Korea. CEE includes transitional economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CIS is not included). 2) The numbers in the table are imprecise due to changing 
availability of data for separate countries and intended only to show principal trends. 3) Employment data 
for high-income countries are for the year 2000. 
Sources: WDI, Goskomstat.  
 
Table 1 covers an eleven-year period for five groups of countries and for Russia.  In all 
countries, agriculture’s and industry’s shares of value added and labor force declined while the shares 
of services rose.  In all countries, agriculture’s relative productivity fell and stood at around half the 
economy-wide productivity level.  In all countries, the service sector had a relative productivity that did 
not deviate significantly from the economy average.  The more developed the country, however, the 
closer the relative productivities of industry and services, suggesting that affluent countries produce 
“high end” services.  
The structural changes in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and 
Russia, were more pronounced than in other countries and followed the general trend of rising services 
and falling industry and agricultural shares. Russia’s transformational changes were percentage-wise 
about the same as in CEE, but Russia started from more “backward” initial conditions (relatively high 
shares of agriculture and industry). 
The transition economies underwent much more significant change over the studied 11 year 
period, while moving in the expected direction. The extent of reallocation of labor force across the three 
aggregate sectors is lower in Russia than in CEE, particularly in agriculture, reflecting lower labor 
mobility due to much larger size of the country, higher concentration of labor, and less flexible labor 
marker institutions. It should be added that employment shares in Russia remained virtually unchanged 
until about 1994. The resistance of the agricultural sector to change appears to contradict the general 
modernization trends in the Russian transitional economy. However, it serves as another piece of 
evidence that the structure of the Soviet economy was driven by central planners rather than by 
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individuals. The removal of artificial labor incentives combined with economic disorganization could 
explain the slow change. It is reasonable to expect, given the comparative patterns of change presented 
in Table 1 and the relative decline of agricultural productivity in Russia, that the outflow of labor from 
agriculture is about to resume.10 
We summarize the dynamic of structural change in the Russian economy with respect to other 
economies using an “index of structural deviation,” which we define as follows: 
Dk = Σi (SRi – Ski)2, 
where SRi is the share of ith sector in the Russian economy and Ski is the average share of ith sector in the 
economies of country group k.  
This index measures the “distance” between the Russian economy and other economies taking 
into account all the components of value added (or labor force) simultaneously. Proximity of D to zero 
would mean that the Russian economy is insignificantly different from the economies of country group 
k. Aggregate value-added and employment indices are presented in Figure 5A and 5B, respectively.11  
Figure 5A shows that the composition of Russian value added (by industry, services, and 
agriculture) differed greatly from that of any other group of market economies at the start of transition. 
The structural distortions (deviations) were eliminated rapidly during the early phase of transition, 
1992-95, and stabilized thereafter. Until the ruble crisis of 1998, the upper-middle and lower-high 
income countries were closest to the Russian pattern, but after the currency crisis, the lower-middle 
income countries are slightly closer to Russia. This means that the crisis caused a structural adjustment 
that pushed the Russian economy closer to its reference income group. Figure 5B shows that the 
                                                     
10 New data (Russian Statistical Yearbook 2003) suggest that this process is already under way: the share of 
agricultural employment proper (without forestry and fishing) declined from 13% to 11.8% in 2000-2.    
11 Index of structural deviation, Dk, measures only the relative distance between the Russian economy and that of a 
corresponding country group. Absolute values of the index, as well as position of various country group curves in 
the graph bear no meaning. In particular, the nearly equal values of the indices for the lower-high and lower-
middle countries do not mean that these are countries similar, only that the Russian economy is equidistant in 
structural terms from both groups. 
 13
employment shares follow a different path, as might be expected from the slower movement of 
employment.  On the eve of transition in 1990, the Russian labor force distribution closely resembled 
that of lower-middle income countries despite a significantly higher level of income, while deviations 
from closer income groups were relatively large. The first few years of transition had a small effect on 
the labor force distribution. The general tendency in the subsequent years is toward convergence with 
upper-middle and lower-high income country groups.   
 
International Comparisons: Nine Sectors 
The aggregate (agriculture, industry, services) patterns show rapid adjustment of value-added 
shares, lagged and less pronounced reallocation of labor shares, with subsequent stabilization of both 
processes. Table 2 uses a nine-sector ILO classification (1-digit ISIC Rev.3) to compare Russia’s labor 
force distributions with those of a large number of countries again aggregated into income groups.  
 
Table 2. Employment Shares, Eight Economic Branches (ILO categories) 
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1990         5.7        28.0          7.3         1.0         9.2       20.8         0.5         6.9        20.0  
2001 
H 
        3.8        31.1          7.2         0.7       12.7       16.8         0.4         7.2        20.0  
1990       15.1        23.4          7.4         0.8         6.0       22.9         0.5         5.7        17.9  
2001 
LH 
        8.9        24.6          8.8         0.7         9.9       17.5         0.2         6.0        22.4  
1990       15.6        31.5          6.6         1.0         4.4       18.0         1.8         5.6        18.9  
2001 
UM 
        9.3        29.5          8.0         0.7         6.1       17.0         0.5         6.8        22.1  
1990       28.1        24.9          5.3         0.6         2.7       15.3         1.0         4.9        16.9  
2001 
LM 
      22.1        22.4          6.5         0.6         4.5       13.9         0.8         6.0        23.0  
1990       13.2        21.9        13.4         0.8         0.8       29.2         1.5         7.7          7.8  
2001 
Russia 
      13.4        28.1          8.8         1.5         2.4       20.2         1.3         7.8        14.6  
Source: ILO, Goskomstat. Calculations by the authors. 
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Trends in the nine-sector classification are less pronounced than those in the three sector 
classification. In all country groups, the employment shares of agriculture (including fishing and 
forestry) fell, the share of utilities (electricity, gas, and water) was roughly stable, the share of 
financing, insurance, and real estate rose, the share of manufacturing fell, the share of transportation 
and communication rose modestly, and the shares of trade rose in all groups except the high income 
countries. Russian employment shares moved in the same direction for those sectors where trends were 
evident, although Russia’s trends were more pronounced given its more “backward” initial employment 
shares.  Even after eleven years of adjustment, Russia’s 13 percent employment share in agriculture 
(broadly defined) places it above all country groups except lower-middle income countries. Even after a 
tripling of employment shares in financing, insurance and real estate and a doubling of employment 
shares in trade, Russia still remains far behind other country groups including even lower-middle 
income countries. 
Figure 6 quantifies these employment share changes in terms of the index of structural 
deviation. The four curves show a clear pattern of convergence of the Russian 9-sector labor force 
distribution toward that of market economies. Market adjustment process has made the Russian 
economy more similar to all other groups, although the rate and degree of convergence is the highest for 
the upper-middle income country group. The lower-high income group is next closest to that of Russia. 
Again, the upper-middle income and the lower-high income countries appear to constitute the reference 
group for the contemporary Russian economy. Much of the convergence tendency, it appears, can be 
explained by the contraction of the oversized Russian manufacturing sector. However, the largest 
contribution to the reduction of the deviation from Russia’s nearest counterparts is made by the service 
sector category denoted in ILO classification as “Wholesale and Retail Trade and Restaurants and 
Hotels”. In particular, this category is responsible for 50% of the reduction in the “distance” between 
the Russian economy and the lower-high income group between 1990 and 2000.  
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The behavior of the right tails of the index curves in Figure 6 suggest that Russian economy 
might have settled on a convergence path with the upper-middle group after 1998. However, the 
robustness of this trend cannot be established given the relatively few observations. It is apparent, 
however, that the rate of structural change in the Russian economy slowed down in the late 1990s, 
although it had not yet reached  adequate proportions. Future development will show whether this was a 
transitory slowdown, related to the recession of 1998-9, or a permanent stabilization at a state removed 
from the Soviet point of origin but not fully consistent with the parameters of a “normal market” 
economy. 
  
Table 3. Manufacturing value added by sector, percent total. 
Year 
C
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Chemicals Food, beverages and tobacco 
Machinery and 
transport 
equipment 
Textiles and 
clothing 
Other 
manufacturing 
1990 9.9 15.6 27.8 7.2 40.8 
2000 
H 
9.0 14.9 29.9 7.6 38.6 
1990 7.7 16.0 18.5 11.5 46.4 
2000 
LH 8.2 18.4 22.1 10.8 40.5 
1990 11.7 28.5 11.0 7.9 41.0 
2000 
UM 7.9 30.8 14.1 5.8 41.4 
1990 9.2 26.1 13.9 16.0 39.4 
2000 
LM 7.4 30.1 7.2 17.5 38.3 
1990 3.7 7.5 34.6 20.8 33.4 
2001 
Russia 
6.6 13.9 28.3 1.6 49.7 
Source: WDI.  
 
Unlike earlier comparisons that included both labor force and value added shares, we can present only 
value added analysis for manufacturing (Table 3). There are few distinctive trends within 
manufacturing. Food, Beverages and tobacco increased its share in all but the highest income group; 
machinery and transport equipment increased its value added shares except in the lower-middle income 
group. What stands out is Russia’s peculiar initial conditions – an extremely low share of food, 
 16
beverages and tobacco, an extraordinarily high share of machinery, a very high initial share of textiles, 
and a low initial share of chemicals.  
  
Trends in Manufacturing    
Figure 7 again applies our structural convergence index measure to the structure of 
manufacturing value added. It shows that the Russian manufacturing structure on the eve of transition 
was most like that of high and lower-high income countries, inconsistent with Russia’s level of 
economic development. In the first few years of transition, Russia became even closer to these two 
income groups.  The Russian distance from upper-middle and lower-middle income countries was much 
greater. In the course of transition, however, Russian manufacturing did not exhibit strong convergence 
trends.12 The convergence trend with respect to upper-middle income countries is notable, but the 
structure of Russian manufacturing remained far removed from its usual reference group. 
In sum, Russian industry has moved slower toward “normal” proportions than the economy as a 
whole. This may be a result of the higher degree of regulation of industry than service sectors. Whereas 
price liberalization and demonopolization of international trade led to significant changes in the 
composition of the value of industrial output, labor market rigidity produced less adequate labor force 
reallocation. While assessing trends in Russian industry, we should also take into account that implicit 
subsidization of inefficient enterprises may further distort data: the effect of so called “virtual 
economy” (concept introduced by Ickes and Gaddy (1998)), which implies that only a few resource-
extracting sectors generate value added, while the rest of the industry effectively destroys the value. 
The most recent research, however, suggests that one of the supposed “value creating” sectors – 
electricity – itself may be operating at a loss (Ivanenko, 2004). Given the publication of a complete list 
of annual input-output tables, the effect of subsidies can be removed from the picture, insofar as the 
                                                     
12 The only large drop in the indices between 1990 and 1991 obviously cannot be attributed to the  effect of 
transformational reforms and therefore bears no significance. This may have been the consequence of a “pre-
transformation” transformation as a consequence of the collapse of the planning and ministerial system after 1989.  
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input-output tables provide rather detailed sectoral data on subsidies,13 but such research remains to be 
done. 
 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF END USE 
We can measure the structure of an economy either by its production structure or by how it uses 
that production in the end uses of private consumption, public consumption, investment, and net 
exports. The comparative literature on the Soviet system showed that the end-use structure was 
distorted relative to market structures by its relatively low personal consumption shares, its high 
investment rates and, within personal consumption, by high food expenditures and low services 
expenditures. We would expect therefore the private consumption share to rise and the investment rate 
to fall reaching the “normal” levels in the course of transition. Available data, however, show a more 
complicated dynamics. 
Russia and the USSR (1990) were participants in the International Comparison Project (ICP), 
which compares the end-use structures of a large number of countries using a common methodology.  
In the ICP, GDP by end use is valued both in local (domestic) prices and in “international” prices, 
stated usually in dollars. The Russian ICP data are complicated by the fact that the 1990 data are for the 
USSR. However, we can use a study from the early 1990s that compares the GDP structures of Russia 
and the USSR to adjust the 1990 ICP data for the USSR to reflect Russia (Tretyakov and Kostinsky, 
1992). Table 4 provides the adjusted Russian ICP data.  
The most salient feature of the data in Table 4 is the relative decline of fixed investment. This is 
an entirely expected result, although its decline to the unusually low level of less than 15% of GDP is 
the result of extreme uncertainty in the first seven years of transition. The international price and 
domestic price figures show different trends with respect to other components of GDP. There are 
                                                     
13 In fact, the whole subsidy issue may not affect these tables and figures insofar as they are supposed to be in 
“basic” prices which eliminate subsidies as well as indirect taxes. 
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clearly remarkable differences in relative prices between Russia and the international price system. The 
higher shares of government consumption in international prices suggests that government services are 
“very cheap” in Russia; the lower shares of gross fixed capital in international prices suggests that 
capital goods are “relatively expensive” in Russia. The latter result is perhaps the consequence of the 
fact that capital goods are increasingly imported. The higher share of net exports in domestic prices 
suggests that Russians are paying relatively more for foreign imports than residents of other countries. 
 
Table 4. Components of GDP, per cent. 
 International prices Domestic prices 
 1990 1993 1996 1999 1990 1993 1996 1999 
Consumption 55 65 63 60 58 52 61 60 
Government Consumption 15 17 25 27 10 9 11 9 
Gross Fixed Capital 32 11 11 9 39 23 20 14 
Imports/Exports 0 2 2 4 -1 8 4 17 
 
Table 5 shows the combined effect of the changes in the Russian pricing system and domestic 
demand on the composition of personal consumption. The general pattern is that goods freely bought 
and sold (such as food, beverages, and tobacco and clothing and footwear) are expensive in Russia by 
international standards (the domestic-price share exceeds the international price share).  On the other 
hands, goods provided by government, by utilities, or necessities (such as medical care) are very cheap 
by international standards. The remarkable feature is that discrepancies between the domestic price 
system and international prices have been even growing over time, suggesting the continuation of price 
controls. For example, the discrepancy between gross rents, fuel and power was 7 percentage points in 
1990, while it was 24 percentage points in 1999. These figure underscore the urgency of further 
deregulation of the power sector, education, and medical care. In effect, the low (sometimes virtually 
zero) prices of some products placed little or no downward pressure on consumption of those items; so 
that Russian households consumed virtually equal shares of food, beverages and tobacco, rent and 
power, medical care and education measured in international prices, but relatively small shares of the 
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last three measured in domestic prices. The large discrepancies between domestic and international 
prices with respect to housing, power, rents, medical care and education impede the development of 
Russian consumption to a more normal pattern. 
 
Table 5. Personal consumption, per cent (revised  numbers)  
 International prices Domestic prices 
Year 1990 1993 1996 1999 1990 1993 1996 1999 
Clothing & Footwear 
 15 13 11 11 8 6 7 4 
Food, Beverages, 
Tobacco 37 35 34 39 26 21 18 18 
Gross Rents, Fuel & 
Power 6 10 9 6 14 22 24 28 
Household Equipment 
& Operation 
 
7 4 5 1 6 3 2 0 
Medical Care 
 6 6 8 7 13 23 23 21 
Miscellaneous Goods 
& Services 
 
11 11 9 7 12 6 5 5 
Transport & 
Communication 
 
6 6 11 11 5 5 5 7 
Recreation, Education 
 12 12 12 10 18 19 23 18 
 
Additional perspective at the composition of household expenditures is provided by the data 
from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), the annual household survey conducted by 
the University of North Carolina in a number of Russian territories (Mroz et al., 2003). Unfortunately, 
the first round of this survey study was conducted only in Fall 1992, when the structure of consumption 
had been already modified significantly by the hyperinflation. It does, however, show the trends 
through the rest of the 1990s.  
RLMS data (Figure 8) show that food, beverage, and tobacco remain the largest expenditure 
category of Russian households, although the downward trend is apparent here, too. The major 
difference between the patterns of total and private final consumption of households lies with rent and 
utilities. Continuing subsidization of utilities and residential maintenance coupled with mass housing 
privatization produced the result, whereby this category still plays marginal, albeit growing, role in 
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private expenditure. Thus RLMS, which of course is denominated in Russian domestic prices, paints 
the same picture of price-induced distortions in Russian household consumption derived from a source 
that is independent of Goskomstat.  
 
Composition of GDP and Household Consumption in International Comparisons 
Country data analyzed here in conjunction with the Russian trends are divided into three 
income groups. The lower-middle income group is dropped due to lack of data availability in the ICP.14  
In Figure 9 we calculate the index of structural deviations for Russia vis-à-vis high, lower-high, and 
upper middle income countries using international prices. This figure shows how the structure of end 
use of GDP in Russia differs from that of other groups of countries assuming that all countries use 
“international” prices rather than their own domestic prices. Thus the relative overpricing of Russian 
consumption goods and the relative underpricing of government consumption are removed from this 
comparison.  
The index of structural deviations shows that, although the Russian structure by end use 
categories converged during the early or mid 1990s towards that of the three country groups, it was 
about as far from any of the three country group averages in 1999 as it was before the start of transition. 
We hope that a new wave of ICP results will be soon published for a later year (2003), which will allow 
us to determine whether Russia converges towards other groups of countries. 1999 is far removed from 
an ideal year for study in that it immediately follows the currency crisis of August 1998. 
The lack of convergence in the composition of Russian GDP by end use in international prices 
does not necessarily imply a reversal of structural adjustment. In fact, the structure of Russian GDP has 
moved from one extreme to another. The major contribution to this pattern is made by the rapidly 
declining share of investment. Figure 10 shows that investment declined in Russia by 1993 temporarily 
bringing its share in GDP down to more “normal” rates, but the continuing decline thereafter led to 
                                                     
14 The lower-middle income countries represented in ICP are mostly transitional economies that cannot be 
included with the reference market economies.  
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increasing deviations. The investment collapse may be explained by overlapping transformational and 
recessionary effects. The lack of commitment of the Russian government of the 1990s to the creation of 
a secure business environment meant that the collapse of domestic investment could not be partially 
offset by increasing foreign direct investments as in Central and Eastern Europe. From the available 
data, we cannot tell which of the two factors dominated and whether Russian investment will settle at a 
“normal” level after recovers to the pre-transitional level.  
Another factor responsible for the lack of convergence between Russian and market economies 
is Russia’s large and growing government. Figure 11 shows that the share of government consumption 
in Russian GDP exceeded the averages for all reference groups. As in the case of investment, there is no 
reason to believe that government consumption is going to be reduced soon leading to normalization of 
GDP use proportions.  
Figure 12 presents the structural deviation index for the end-use categories in terms of nominal 
domestic prices to capture both domestic relative scarcities and distortions introduced by subsidies or 
other distorting practices.  These data are drawn from World Bank databases and should be 
conceptually the same as the ICP data in domestic prices for the benchmark years (1990, 1993, 1996, 
1999); the advantage of the World Bank data is that they are annual. It should be noted that economic 
decisions in countries are not based on international prices but on domestic prices. Hence, ICP domestic 
price data may be a better test of structural convergence. 
Figure 12, consistent with an earlier similar diagram (Figure 9), shows a substantial 
convergence between 1991 and 1993 towards all three country groups. Thereafter followed periods of 
slight divergence and convergence. From 1993 to 2000, Russian end-use patterns were most like those 
of the lower-high countries. After 1998, there was a reversal of convergence as a consequence of the 
currency crisis of 1998. 
 
Table 6. Components of final household consumption, percent. 1999, International Prices 
(Revised Numbers), per cent. 
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High Lower 
high 
Upper 
middle 
Lower 
middle 
Russia 
 Food, beverages, tobacco 12 16 18 18 18 
 Clothing and footwear 4 4 2 4 4 
 Gross rents, fuel and power 19 17 28 25 28 
 Household equipment and operation 3 3 2 3 0 
 Medical care 17 15 22 15 21 
 Transport and communication 11 10 6 9 7 
 Recreation, education 20 24 32 24 18 
 Miscellaneous goods & services 16 15 9 9 5 
 Net purchases abroad -1 -3 -1 0 0 
 
General tendencies in Russian final household consumption in comparison with market 
economies are summarized in Table 6 for the year 1999. Figure 13 provides the index of structural 
deviation with 1999 as the end point. Both the table and the figure show that Russia is close to an 
average upper-middle income country in its structure of final household consumption, although Soviet 
consumption patterns were characterized by abnormally high proportion of goods (more than two 
thirds) and in particular by a high share of food expenditure, up to 47 per cent (Schroeder, 1992). At the 
same time, the gap between Russia and the more developed countries seems to be increasing. When 
assessing the vector of change, we should take into account that some of the features of Russian 
consumption pattern may reflect transitory effects of the 1998 crisis rather than a turn of the trend. The 
new round of ICP, for the year 2003, should be expected to provide a better picture of the direction of 
change in Russian GDP use structure.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis presents a picture of an economy that has been subjected to three shocks: price 
deregulation, the opening of the economy to trade and hence to world prices, and the ruble devaluation 
of 1998.  The first two shocks meant that branches, whose outputs had been highly valued under 
planning, would now receive relatively low valuations in a market setting and vice versa. The most 
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notable case of an industry that virtually collapsed when confronted with the first two shocks was light 
industry manufacturing. Moreover, the transition to a market economy created a demand for activities 
not present in the planned economy, the supply of which could not be created over night – examples 
being real estate and business, finance, and information services. Those factors with “new” skills would 
be among the most valued and productive resources in the transition economy.  As might be expected, 
the “rents” from scarcity appeared to decline over the years, such as in trade whose relative productivity 
declined from almost four times the economy’s average in 1992 to only 75 percent above the average in 
2001.  
International comparisons show that Russia is becoming increasingly similar in terms of sector-
of-origin structure to upper-middle and to the lower tier of high-income countries (such as Greece, 
Portugal, Cyprus, and South Korea) despite the fact that Russian per capita GDP is well below these 
groups. However, the structure of manufacturing still bears the strong imprint of initial Soviet 
conditions. Russia’s industrial structure is not consistent with its income level, resembling the structure 
of high-income countries, a fact that works against successful restructuring. 
Whereas the shifts in output shares took place quickly (within the first two to three years of 
transition), the shifts in labor force shares were slow to materialize given the initial lack of organized 
labor markets, barriers to movement, and the continuation of paternalistic behavior by large enterprises. 
Nevertheless, the labor force did generally redistribute itself according to relative productivity. The 
charts also show the large, albeit transitory, impact of the exchange rate on economic activity. The ruble 
devaluation of 1998 caused a reversal of the decline in manufacturing (particularly of metallurgy) as 
Russia’s industrial products became more competitive in world markets. Sectors of industry that were 
more productive on average (in terms of value added per worker) in 1990 remained so a decade later. 
The exception is “light industry” which fell from a higher than average position to the lowest one. It can 
be concluded therefore that, despite the significant restructuring of industry, efficiency losses resulting 
from misallocation of resources in the previous-period Soviet economy were not eliminated but 
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probably were made even higher due to governmental policies that failed to make labor markets more 
flexible. 
Unlike patterns of production structure and labor force distribution, which have been changing 
in the direction of reference countries, the Russian pattern of consumption remains difficult to 
characterize. It has moved from being an over-investor and under-consumer to an over-consumer and 
under-investor. These over-adjustments result in a remarkable lack of convergence in the major end-use 
shares to the benchmark economies. Patterns of household consumption behave even more erratically 
with domestic prices deviating significantly from international prices. If anything, Russian household 
consumption resembles the pattern of lower-middle and upper-middle income countries, but changes 
have been erratic. The apparent culprit is the lack of price reform in housing, education, medicine, and 
utilities, which means that Russian households are still operating under a system of non-scarcity prices. 
Since recent and current Russian policy-makers show no commitment to further price liberalization, we 
can expect the structure of Russia consumption to remain atypical in the near future. 
 25
REFERENCES 
 
Bergson, Abram, The Economics of Soviet Planning. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964. 
Chenery, Hollis, Sherman Robinson, and Moshe Syrquin,. Industrialization and Growth: A 
Comparative Study, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Desai, Padma, The Soviet Economy: Problems and Prospects, Blackwell, 1987. 
Gaddy, Clifford, and Barry Ickes. Russia’s Virtual Economy, Foreign Affairs, 77, 5: 53-66, 1998. 
Goskomstat Rossii, Natsional’nye scheta Rossii v 1989-1994 godakh, Moscow: Goskomstat, 1995  
Goskomstat Rossii, Natsional’nye scheta Rossii v 1995-2002 godakh, Moscow: Goskomstat, 2003.  
Goskomstat Rossii, Russian Statistical Yearbook, Moscow: Goskomstat, 2003. 
Gregory, Paul, Socialist and Nonsocialist Industrialization Patterns. New York: Praeger, 1970.  
Gregory, Paul, and Robert Stuart, Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed., 
Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley, 2001. 
Ivanenko, Vlad. “Searching for the Value-subtraction in the Russian Economy”, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 32, 1:88-104, March 2004. 
Kuznets, Simon, “A Comparative Appraisal,” In Abram Bergson and Simon Kuznets, Eds., Economic 
Trends in the Soviet Union, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963. 
Larina, E., The Russian Journal, Dec, 7-13, 2001. 
Mroz, T., L. Henderson, M. Bontch-Osmolovsii, and B.M. Popkin. “Monitoring Economic Conditions 
in the Russian Federation: The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 1992-2002.” Chapel Hill, 
NC: Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, March 2003. 
Ofer, Gur, The Service Sector in Soviet Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1973.  
Rosefielde, Steven, Ed., Efficiency and Russia’s Economic Recovery Potential, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1998.  
 26
Schroeder, Gertrude, and Imogene Edwards, Consumption in the USSR: An International Comparison, 
Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981. 
Schroeder, Gertrude, “Dimensions of Russia’s Industrial Transformation, 1992-1998: An Overview,” 
Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 39, 5:243-271, May 1998. 
Schroeder, Gertrude, “Soviet Consumption in the 1980s: A Tale of Woe,” In Michael Ellman and 
Vladimir Kontorovich, Eds., The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System, London and New 
York: Routlegde, 1992. 
Stuart, Robert, and Christina Panayotopoulos, “Decline and Recovery in Transition Economies: The 
Impact of Initial Conditions,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 40, 4: 267-80, 1999. 
Tabata, Shinichiro, “Changes in the Structure and Distribution of Russian GDP in the 1990s,” Post-
Soviet Geography and Economics, 37, 3:129-144, 1996. 
Tretyakov, A., and Barry Kostinsky, Gross National Product Accounts of the Newly Independent States 
of the Former Soviet Union, 1987-1990, Washington, D.C.: Center for International Research, U.S. 
Bureau of Census, December 1992. 
World Bank, Russian Economic Report, www.worldbank.org. February 2004. 
World Bank and State Statistics Committee of the Government of the Russian Federation, Russian 
Federation: Report on the National Accounts, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995. 
World Bank, From Transition to Development: A Country Economic Memorandum for the Russian 
Federation, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004. 
 
 
 27
FIGURES 
 
0.00% 
5.00% 
10.00% 
15.00% 
20.00% 
25.00% 
30.00% 
35.00% 
40.00% 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
industry excluding electricity and fuels
electricity and fuels (includiong geology,
metereology) 
agriculture 
construction 
transport and communication 
trade
business, financial, information services
PA-HEAS 
 
Figure 1A. Shares of Value Added. Russia, 1990-2001. 
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Figure 1B. Shares of Labor Force. Russia, 1990-2001. 
 28
 
0.0% 
100.0% 
200.0% 
300.0% 
400.0% 
500.0% 
600.0% 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
industry excluding electricity and fuels
electricity and fuels (including geology,
meterology) 
agriculture 
construction 
transport and communication
trade 
business, financial, information services
PA-HEAS  
 Figure 1C. Relative Labor Productivity. Russia, 1990-2001. 
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Figure 2: Government Employment as Share of Total. USSR, 1970-90; Russia, 1990-2002. 
Source: CIS Statistical Committee. CISTAT database. 2001. 
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 Figure 3A. Manufacturing Value Added Shares. Russia, 1990-2001. 
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  Figure 3B. Manufacturing Labor Force Shares. Russia, 1990-2001. 
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Figure 3C. Manufacturing Relative Productivity. Russia, 1990-2001. 
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Figure 4. Level of development and service sector employment, 1990 and 2000. 
Source: WDI. 
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Figure 5A. Indices of structural deviation. Value-added shares of Agriculture, Industry and 
Services 
Source: WDI, Goskomstat. Calculations by the authors. 
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Figure 5B. Indices of structural deviation. Employment. Shares of Agriculture, Industry, and 
Services 
Source: WDI, Goskomstat. Calculations by the authors. 
 
 
 
 
 33
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
0.060
0.070
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
High
"Low er high"
Low er Middle
Upper middle
  
Figure 6. Indices of structural deviation. Nine-sector distribution of labor. 
Source: ILO, Goskomstat. Calculations by the authors. 
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Figure 7. Indices of structural deviation. Manufacturing value added. 
Source: WDI. Calculations by the authors.   
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Figure 9. Indices of structural deviation for Russia. End use of GDP, international prices. 
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Figure 8. Structure of private household expenditure in Russia. RLMS data. 
Source: Mroz et al. 2003. 
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Figure 10. Shares of gross capital formation in GDP, international prices. 
Source: WDI. 
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Figure 11. Shares of government consumption in GDP, International Prices 
Source: ICP. 
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Figure 12. Indices of structural deviation for Russia. End use of GDP, domestic prices. 
Source: WDI. 
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Figure 13. Indices of Structural Deviation for Russia. Structure of Household Consumption, 
international prices 
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APPENDIX 1. DATA TABLES 
 
Table A1a. Distribution of Gross Value Added, percent  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Electricity 1.56 1.63 3.34 3.86 4.15 3.46 4.72 5.17 5.19 3.11 2.74 2.82 
Fuels 2.60 4.30 7.70 6.54 5.21 6.00 6.12 6.32 5.70 7.02 9.10 7.80 
Ferrous metals 1.37 1.78 2.19 2.19 2.04 2.21 1.72 1.46 1.75 2.28 2.33 1.73 
Nonferrous metals 1.32 2.12 1.87 2.02 1.74 2.39 1.75 1.72 2.78 3.88 3.91 3.08 
Chemicals  1.30 2.50 1.77 1.65 1.66 1.83 1.42 1.31 1.48 1.72 1.61 1.38 
Machinery 12.18 11.08 7.40 8.16 7.73 5.50 6.56 5.83 5.85 5.85 5.58 5.93 
Wood processing 2.85 2.80 1.90 1.81 1.79 1.51 0.98 0.91 1.09 1.48 1.39 1.15 
Construction materials 1.73 1.85 1.16 1.38 1.50 1.40 1.42 1.17 1.03 0.77 0.76 0.81 
Light 7.32 4.88 0.74 0.70 0.48 0.73 0.53 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.35 
Food 2.65 3.86 2.36 3.10 3.13 2.82 3.12 2.97 3.59 3.23 2.71 2.91 
Other industry 2.95 1.37 3.38 3.02 3.47 1.25 1.34 1.29 1.30 1.05 1.01 0.83 
Agriculture 16.44 13.87 7.14 8.02 6.32 7.04 7.14 6.48 5.68 7.56 6.60 6.87 
Business services 0.00 1.36 0.13 1.29 0.69 1.27 1.19 1.56 0.95 3.07 3.16 2.91 
Construction 9.51 9.43 6.30 7.94 9.13 8.53 8.45 7.99 7.13 6.15 7.24 8.24 
Education, culture and art 5.36 3.82 2.88 3.78 3.95 3.80 4.29 4.76 4.42 2.94 2.75 2.86 
Finance/credit/insurance 0.85 2.21 4.61 5.16 4.44 1.57 0.57 0.73 0.52 0.90 1.25 1.92 
Forestry 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 
General government 2.82 2.45 2.14 3.14 4.74 5.26 5.22 6.25 6.83 4.93 4.72 4.83 
Geology  and meteorology 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.36 
Health, physical culture social security 2.75 2.75 1.68 2.70 3.22 2.93 3.20 3.77 3.10 2.42 2.15 2.21 
Housing, communal, and personal services 3.77 2.50 1.94 3.27 3.59 5.41 6.08 5.95 5.51 3.07 2.73 2.83 
Information and computer services 0.22 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 
Real estate 0.00 0.07 0.23 0.39 0.56 1.38 1.25 1.78 2.75 3.46 3.18 3.53 
Science and scientific services 2.72 2.07 0.94 1.11 0.98 0.81 1.04 0.92 0.89 0.82 0.90 0.81 
Trade, catering, supply and procurement 6.02 12.27 29.01 19.06 18.46 19.78 18.40 17.70 19.76 23.19 23.64 23.02 
Transport and communication 9.99 7.47 7.42 8.66 9.92 11.92 12.38 12.32 11.01 9.71 9.12 10.12 
"Other industries of material production sphere" 1.26 1.18 1.26 0.63 0.56 0.72 0.56 0.63 0.74 0.50 0.53 0.53 
Social organizations (no match in labor data) 0.37 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.78 0.99 0.18 0.15 0.19 
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Table A1b. Distribution of Gross Value Added, percent  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Electricity 0.72 0.76 0.87 0.94 1.04 1.13 1.20 1.25 1.32 1.38 1.42 1.46 
Fuels 1.06 1.10 1.21 1.25 1.26 1.27 1.30 1.27 1.24 1.15 1.13 1.25 
Ferrous metals 1.04 1.05 1.10 1.11 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.11 1.13 
Nonferrous metals 0.65 0.68 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.87 0.90 
Chemicals  1.39 1.51 1.59 1.57 1.48 1.35 1.29 1.27 1.21 1.19 1.22 1.23 
Machinery 12.80 12.31 12.16 11.20 10.26 9.25 8.48 8.09 7.57 7.33 7.32 7.21 
Wood processing 2.38 2.34 2.52 2.32 2.24 2.08 1.91 1.76 1.62 1.65 1.71 1.64 
Construction materials 1.46 1.44 1.58 1.55 1.52 1.46 1.32 1.21 1.12 1.12 1.06 1.05 
Light 3.04 2.90 2.56 2.40 2.34 2.00 1.72 1.56 1.39 1.35 1.32 1.26 
Food 2.05 2.08 2.16 2.20 2.27 2.27 2.25 2.25 2.19 2.25 2.31 2.32 
Other industry 1.29 0.93 1.30 1.34 1.24 1.35 1.26 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.17 
Agriculture 12.91 13.18 14.03 14.26 15.01 14.67 14.04 13.28 13.67 13.28 13.01 11.90 
Business services 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.61 0.51 0.57 0.57 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.80 
Construction 11.98 11.49 10.94 10.08 9.91 9.34 8.91 8.76 7.98 7.95 7.78 8.79 
Education, culture and art 0.53 0.60 0.68 0.82 1.09 1.23 1.21 1.20 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.27 
Finance/credit/insurance 9.60 9.85 10.44 10.22 10.78 11.01 11.09 11.04 11.02 11.04 10.91 11.44 
Forestry 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.38 
General government 2.40 2.33 2.11 2.33 2.42 3.03 4.24 4.26 4.68 4.89 5.00 4.87 
Geology  and meteorology 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Health, physical culture social security 5.63 5.83 5.87 5.99 6.42 6.69 6.87 6.83 6.99 7.03 7.00 7.05 
Housing, communal, and personal services 4.27 4.28 4.15 4.21 4.41 4.48 4.86 5.19 5.34 5.26 5.16 5.28 
Information and computer services 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.19 
Real estate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.29 
Science and scientific services 3.72 3.75 3.20 3.16 2.68 2.54 2.30 2.21 2.04 1.89 1.87 1.91 
Trade, catering, supply and procurement 7.79 7.62 7.88 9.00 9.47 10.05 10.30 13.49 14.59 14.57 14.65 14.64 
Transport and communication 7.72 7.79 7.81 7.63 7.82 7.91 7.92 7.92 7.60 7.69 7.79 7.98 
"Other industries of material production sphere" 2.17 2.03 2.13 1.50 1.11 1.23 1.36 1.12 1.03 1.10 1.23 0.81 
Industrial labor not included in the 11 sectors  2.40 3.24 1.81 2.74 1.66 1.77 2.17 1.39 1.55 1.91 1.94 1.51 
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Table A1c. Relative Productivity (economy average = 100) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Electricity 216 214 385 410 400 307 394 413 393 226 193 193 
Fuels 245 390 638 523 415 471 471 498 458 608 802 623 
Ferrous metals 131 170 198 197 190 202 156 138 166 216 211 153 
Nonferrous metals 205 311 253 264 231 289 215 218 369 493 449 341 
Chemicals  93 166 111 106 113 136 110 103 122 145 132 112 
Machinery 95 90 61 73 75 59 77 72 77 80 76 82 
Wood processing 120 120 75 78 80 73 51 52 67 89 81 70 
Construction materials 119 128 74 89 99 95 108 97 92 69 71 77 
Light 241 168 29 29 21 36 31 28 30 30 29 27 
Food 129 186 110 141 138 125 138 132 164 144 117 125 
Other industry 229 147 260 225 281 93 106 111 111 89 85 72 
Agriculture 127 105 51 56 42 48 51 49 42 57 51 58 
Business services   70 213 135 222 208 208 122 390 407 365 
Construction 79 82 58 79 92 91 95 91 89 77 93 94 
Education, culture and art 1005 642 420 461 363 307 354 396 383 252 239 226 
Finance/credit/insurance 9 22 44 50 41 14 5 7 5 8 11 17 
Forestry 26 34 37 45 50 39 48 38 35 30 29 30 
General government 118 105 101 135 196 174 123 147 146 101 94 99 
Geology  and meteorology 0 0 79 53 77 83 99 128 116 114 130 130 
Health, physical culture social security 49 47 29 45 50 44 47 55 44 34 31 31 
Housing, communal, and personal services 88 59 47 78 82 121 125 115 103 59 53 53 
Information and computer services 89 52 42 56 88 59 78 40 57 45 45 53 
Real estate    3762 3019 4919 2610 1974 2342 1896 1265 1208 
Science and scientific services 73 55 29 35 37 32 45 42 43 44 48 42 
Trade, catering, supply and procurement 77 161 368 212 195 197 179 131 135 159 161 157 
Transport and communication 129 96 95 113 127 151 156 156 145 126 117 127 
"Other industries of material production sphere" 58 58 59 42 51 59 41 56 72 46 43 65 
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Table A2. Value Added, Labor Force, and Relative Productivity, 8 major sectors  
             
Value added 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Industry excluding electricity and fuels 33.68 32.23 22.77 24.04 23.56 19.65 18.85 17.09 19.28 20.66 19.66 18.15 
Electricity and fuels (incl.geology, meteorology) 4.16 5.93 11.36 10.59 9.60 9.71 11.12 11.84 11.21 10.43 12.19 10.97 
Agriculture 16.53 13.98 7.27 8.17 6.50 7.19 7.32 6.62 5.81 7.67 6.70 6.98 
Construction 9.51 9.43 6.30 7.94 9.13 8.53 8.45 7.99 7.13 6.15 7.24 8.24 
Transport and communication 9.99 7.47 7.42 8.66 9.92 11.92 12.38 12.32 11.01 9.71 9.12 10.12 
Trade 6.02 12.27 29.01 19.06 18.46 19.78 18.40 17.70 19.76 23.19 23.64 23.02 
Business, financial, information services 1.06 3.74 5.04 6.92 5.79 4.29 3.10 4.15 4.31 7.50 7.67 8.46 
PA-HEAS 17.42 13.59 9.89 14.18 16.72 18.45 20.12 22.01 21.07 14.49 13.60 13.89 
             
Shares of labor force 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Industry excluding electricity and fuels 26.09 25.24 25.70 24.43 23.17 21.69 20.15 19.13 18.08 17.91 18.11 17.91 
Electricity and fuels (incl.geology, meteorology) 2.22 2.28 2.47 2.55 2.60 2.70 2.78 2.79 2.84 2.80 2.82 2.99 
Agriculture 13.23 13.50 14.36 14.60 15.37 15.05 14.42 13.65 14.05 13.66 13.38 12.28 
Construction 11.98 11.49 10.94 10.08 9.91 9.34 8.91 8.76 7.98 7.95 7.78 8.79 
Transport and communication 7.72 7.79 7.81 7.63 7.82 7.91 7.92 7.92 7.60 7.69 7.79 7.98 
Trade 7.79 7.62 7.88 9.00 9.47 10.05 10.30 13.49 14.59 14.57 14.65 14.64 
Business, financial, information services 0.78 0.78 1.04 1.57 1.73 1.95 1.94 2.22 2.21 2.30 2.37 2.55 
PA-HEAS 28.03 28.25 28.05 27.53 27.93 29.10 30.81 30.83 31.25 31.38 31.35 31.56 
             
Relative productivity 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Industry excluding electricity and fuels 129.1 127.7 88.6 98.4 101.7 90.6 93.6 89.3 106.6 115.3 108.5 101.3 
Electricity and fuels (incl.geology, meteorology) 187.5 260.3 459.2 415.2 368.5 360.1 399.5 424.0 394.6 373.0 431.7 367.0 
Agriculture 124.9 103.5 50.6 56.0 42.3 47.8 50.8 48.5 41.4 56.2 50.1 56.9 
Construction 79.4 82.0 57.6 78.8 92.1 91.2 94.8 91.3 89.3 77.3 93.2 93.8 
Transport and communication 129.3 95.9 94.9 113.5 126.9 150.8 156.4 155.6 144.8 126.3 117.0 126.8 
Trade 77.3 161.1 368.2 211.9 195.0 196.8 178.6 131.2 135.4 159.1 161.4 157.2 
Business, financial, information services 136.8 481.5 484.5 440.8 334.4 220.1 160.1 186.7 195.1 326.4 323.9 332.3 
PA-HEAS  62.1 48.1 35.3 51.5 59.9 63.4 65.3 71.4 67.4 46.2 43.4 44.0 
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Table A3, Value Added, Labor Force, and Relative Productivity, per cent industry total          
Value added 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
electricity 4.1 4.3 9.9 11.2 12.6 11.9 15.9 18.1 17.2 10.1 8.7 9.8 
Fuels 6.9 11.3 22.8 19.0 15.8 20.6 20.6 22.1 18.9 22.8 28.9 27.1 
Ferrous 3.6 4.7 6.5 6.4 6.2 7.6 5.8 5.1 5.8 7.4 7.4 6.0 
nonferrous 3.5 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.3 8.2 5.9 6.0 9.2 12.6 12.4 10.7 
chemicals  3.4 6.6 5.2 4.8 5.1 6.3 4.8 4.6 4.9 5.6 5.1 4.8 
machinery 32.2 29.0 21.9 23.7 23.5 18.9 22.1 20.4 19.4 19.0 17.7 20.6 
Forestry&wood processing 7.5 7.3 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.2 3.3 3.2 3.6 4.8 4.4 4.0 
construction mats 4.6 4.8 3.4 4.0 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.1 3.4 2.5 2.4 2.8 
Light 19.3 12.8 2.2 2.0 1.5 2.5 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 
Food 7.0 10.1 7.0 9.0 9.5 9.7 10.5 10.4 11.9 10.5 8.6 10.1 
Other 7.8 3.6 10.0 8.8 10.5 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.3 3.4 3.2 2.9 
             
Labor Force Shares 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
electricity 2.60 2.81 3.13 3.53 4.07 4.69 5.29 5.78 6.39 6.73 6.87 7.09 
Fuels 3.81 4.07 4.35 4.70 4.93 5.29 5.73 5.86 6.03 5.64 5.49 6.07 
Ferrous 3.74 3.86 3.97 4.18 4.23 4.54 4.87 4.88 5.11 5.17 5.35 5.47 
nonferrous 2.32 2.51 2.66 2.87 2.96 3.43 3.60 3.63 3.64 3.85 4.21 4.38 
chemicals  5.00 5.57 5.71 5.88 5.80 5.59 5.71 5.87 5.88 5.82 5.90 5.99 
machinery 45.90 45.43 43.79 42.05 40.30 38.42 37.43 37.34 36.69 35.85 35.42 34.95 
Forestry&wood processing 8.53 8.62 9.06 8.70 8.80 8.64 8.44 8.12 7.85 8.08 8.29 7.94 
construction mats 5.22 5.33 5.67 5.80 5.96 6.08 5.81 5.59 5.41 5.49 5.15 5.10 
Light 10.90 10.72 9.22 9.01 9.17 8.32 7.59 7.18 6.74 6.60 6.39 6.13 
Food 7.36 7.66 7.76 8.25 8.91 9.41 9.96 10.38 10.60 11.00 11.16 11.23 
Other 4.62 3.43 4.69 5.03 4.85 5.60 5.58 5.38 5.66 5.77 5.77 5.65 
             
Relative Productivity 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
electricity 158.9 152.3 316.1 317.3 309.6 254.0 300.6 313.0 269.1 150.1 126.7 138.2 
Fuels 180.2 276.7 524.1 404.5 320.8 389.7 359.4 377.1 313.6 404.0 526.3 446.6 
Ferrous 96.5 120.7 163.1 152.3 146.6 167.3 119.1 104.6 113.5 143.2 138.4 109.6 
nonferrous 150.8 221.2 207.8 203.9 178.6 239.1 164.1 165.5 252.5 327.6 294.4 244.2 
chemicals  68.7 117.8 91.5 81.6 87.2 112.7 84.1 78.4 83.3 96.2 86.4 80.2 
machinery 70.1 63.9 49.9 56.4 58.3 49.2 59.0 54.6 52.9 53.0 50.0 58.9 
Forestry&wood processing 88.3 85.0 62.0 60.4 61.9 60.2 39.1 39.4 45.9 59.4 53.1 50.4 
construction mats 87.7 90.8 60.7 69.1 76.4 79.0 82.6 73.4 62.8 45.5 46.6 54.9 
Light 177.5 119.4 23.9 22.6 16.1 30.0 23.7 20.9 20.8 19.7 18.8 19.6 
Food 95.3 132.0 90.0 109.2 106.9 103.1 105.5 100.2 112.3 95.4 77.0 89.9 
Other 168.9 104.3 213.3 174.3 217.2 76.8 80.7 83.7 76.0 59.0 55.5 51.3 
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APPENDIX 2. The World Bank Critique 
The tables and figures cited in this paper are based upon official Goskomstat statistics, whose 
validity has been disputed by World Bank studies (World Bank, 2004). Two related World Bank studies 
argue that Goskomstat’s distribution of value added between the oil and gas sector (which accounts for 
the bulk of the electricity and fuel sector above) grossly overstates the trade share and grossly 
understates the oil and gas value added share. The World Bank studies do not alter the distribution of 
labor force shares; hence, they suggest very substantial upward revisions of the relative productivity of 
oil and gas and substantial downward revisions of trade’s relative productivity. 
The crux of the World Bank argument is that Russian oil and gas firms use low transfer prices 
(either to conceal their true income and to reduce their tax burdens) and thereby shift value added to 
trade and to transportation. By selling energy at transfer prices that are “too low”, value added that truly 
belongs to oil and gas is shifted to trade in the form of inflated profits, which are the primary 
component of trade’s value added. Empirical support for this conclusion is found in (what the World 
Bank considers to be) inflated trade and transport margins relative to other energy producers. The 
World Bank compares transport and trade margins in Russia with those of the UK and the Netherlands 
(where transport and trade margins are calculated together) and with trade margins in Canada (where 
trade margins are given separately). The key trade margins for the year 2000 are recorded in Table A2-
1. 
Table A2-1. Trade Margins, Oil and Gas Sectors, Russian and Canada, 2000 
 Russia Canada 
Oil extraction 30.7% 0.0% 
Oil refining 36.6% 17.2% 
Gas 63.1% 0.0% 
Source: World Bank, From Transition to Development, p. 62. 
 
The discrepancy between Russian oil and gas trade and transport margins are even larger as 
compared to those of the UK and Netherlands, but the World Bank recognizes that their trade and 
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transport conditions are quite different from Russia and that Canada serves as a better benchmark. 
Another notable proof of Russia’s exaggerated oil and gas margins is said to be that margins for other 
branches of the economy are similar to those of Canada, UK, or the Netherlands. Table A2-1 does raise 
the interesting puzzle of zero margins for oil extraction and natural gas, products that are traded across 
borders and transported long distances.  It would be advised to examine definitions to determine how 
the zero rate is arrived at.  
When World Bank specialists shifted the “excess” of the trade (or trade and transport margins) 
from profits in trade to profits in oil and gas, the result is a substantial change in the distribution of 
value added in favor of oil and gas and away from trade, as is shown by Table A2-2. This adjustment 
results in changes in other sector shares, but such changes are modest and are ignored in the following 
discussion. 
 
Table A2-2: Goskomstat and World Bank Estimates of Value Added Shares, 2000 
 Goskomstat Canadian margins UK margins Netherlands 
margins 
Oil and gas 7.8 19.2 25.2 24.9 
Trade 27.3 14.6 11.0 9.4 
Source:  Ibid., p.63; Russian Economic report, February 2004, p. 15. 
 
Figure A2-1 shows the effects of the World Bank value added adjustments on the official 
estimates of relative labor productivity by sector.  Insofar as the World Bank adjustments affect 
primarily trade and fuels, the relative productivities of the other branches remain relatively unchanged.  
Manufacturing, transport and construction remain near the economy average, agriculture and PA-HEAS 
remain well below the economy average.  
World Bank specialists have used these figures to argue that Russia’s industrial sector is still 
more productive than its service sector and implicitly that resources should flow to “industry” rather 
than to “services.”  The benchmark year 2000 may not be representative given that the positive effects 
of devaluation on manufacturing and metals were still being felt. However, the validity of the argument 
 44
does not really rest on the choice of benchmark year. Figure A2-1 shows that the relatively low 
productivity of services (under the World Bank variant) is the consequence of exceptionally low 
productivity in public administration, health, education and science, which is compensated in the 
combined service figure by the very high productivity of market service sectors. As a guide to resources 
allocation, Figure A2-1 suggests that resources should flow into mining and market services and 
perhaps transportation infrastructure and not into manufacturing.  Moreover, in what is largely a market 
economy, resources will likely flow spontaneously to the sectors with higher returns. Moreover, 
remaining Russian subsidies are largely for manufacturing; so economic policy already favors 
manufacturing over services. The gradual decline of manufacturing employment provides a rather clear 
signal that its productivity is low relative to other pursuits. 
 
Figure A2-1: Sector Productivity Comparisons: World Bank vs. Goskomstat Estimates 
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The basic assumption of World Bank analysts is that the high oil and gas transport and trade 
margins are pure tax avoidance (or worse) schemes without economic foundations.  In the Russian 
context, however, one must ask, to the contrary, whether high trade and transport margins are the 
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consequence of natural economic processes. A number of sources suggest that it is difficult to 
distinguish between value added attributed to trade and to transport. Those marketing and transporting 
the product can attribute the revenue either to trading activities or to transport activities. Therefore it 
makes sense to combine trade and transport margins in the discussion that follows. 
 
Figure A2-2: Payments for Trade and transport  for oil and gas exports and for total product,  
2000 (bil rubles)
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
oil production oil refined products gas oil and gas total economy total 
margins for exports
total margins
 
Figure A2-2 shows the combined Russian trade and transport payments for oil and gas products 
and for the entire economy in 2000 broken down into payments for exported products and for the 
product as a whole (domestic uses plus exports).  It shows that, except for refined oil products 
(gasoline, jet fuel, heating oil), which are used primarily domestically, more than half of the trade and 
transport fees are paid on oil and gas products that were exported. Does this make any economic sense, 
or does it suggest simply a device to avoid taxes?  
The answer depends, to a degree, on where scarcity lies in an economy. Is the scarce resource 
oil and gas as natural resources or is it marketing knowledge and/or the transportation infrastructure?  In 
Russia, the natural gas monopoly (Gazprom) both produces gas and owns the transportation system, but 
its export pipelines go through two sovereign nations before reaching their ultimate export markets. In 
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the oil sector, most export pipeline capacity is controlled by a state-controlled entity (Transneft), which 
is in a position to extract rents in the form of marketing or transportation fees from oil producers.  In 
Russia, where domestic prices of energy are well below world prices, those who are in a position to 
extract rents between the well head and the final distribution point are those who control access to 
export markets, through their control of export licenses, access to pipelines, ability to gain official 
permissions and so on. Assuming that domestic energy prices roughly equal the cost of production plus 
a normal profit, the economic rents in the energy market (per physical unit of product) roughly equal 
the difference between the world and domestic prices, which, in the case of natural gas, is a ratio of four 
to one. The margins in Figure A2-2 may simply reflect the relative scarcities of modern Russia in which 
wellhead oil or natural gas is not a particularly valuable resource compared to other resources required 
to get it to market. 
One way to judge whether the pattern of trade and transport margins make economic sense is to 
examine trends over time. Figure A2-3 compares the 1991 trade and transport margin (combined) 
(Goskomstat 1995) with that of 2000 and reveals that the 2000 margin for oil and gas combined was 
only slightly above that of 1991. Given that the year 1991 counts as a pre-transition year, we would 
expect tax-avoidance and other value-added-redistributing activities to differ from those of 2000; 
therefore, it is remarkable that margins were about the same in the two years. Figure A2-3 also shows 
that margins remained relatively stable although payments for export margins increased dramatically as 
a percent of total margin payments, which itself is explained by the fact that exports as a percent of total 
energy expanded substantially as well. 15 
It would require a detailed study to determine how trade and transport margins are calculated 
by Goskomstat given that domestic energy prices differ from export prices.  According to Goskomstat, 
the margins are calculated as a percent of their “full cost” in the prices paid by the user (Goskomstat 
1995: 127).  This definition raises conceptual issues:  For example, in 1991, the trade and transport 
                                                     
15 Note that the above figures measure export and production in value terms. We do not know how these 
calculations are made in light of the large differences in domestic and world prices. 
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margin paid by the electricity sector in acquiring oil and gas products was 49%, the economy average 
was 36%, and the export margin was 33 percent (Goskomstat 1995: 126-9).  The higher margin paid by 
electricity for oil and gas may therefore be the result of a higher margin payment (in rubles) or it may 
be the result of a lower price. In fact, given that the export price of natural gas is currently some four 
times that of the domestic price, a 48 percent margin on the low domestic price may represent a 
relatively small payment. This technical issue requires considerable study beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
A final skeptical word on the World Bank criticism: The industrial structure of any country 
reflects its institutions, including how its enterprises organize themselves (into conglomerates or by 
product divisions), their tax systems, and the degree of price controls. U.S. economic statistics, for 
example, will likely show a relatively low percentage of corporate dividends (due to their double 
taxation) and a relatively large home building sector (due to mortgage interest deduction). If the 
Russian tax system encourages energy concerns to separate trading and transport functions from the 
functions of production and refining, this fact should be reflected in Russian production statistics. If the 
Russian state dictates that domestic prices be well below world prices, this creates opportunities to earn 
economic rents and makes those with the skills and knowledge to capture such rents. Buyers of refined 
products or of natural gas would be willing to share rents with intermediaries in order to buy at the low 
domestic price. Sellers would be willing to share rents with intermediaries in order to sell at the world 
price. Given that such pricing policies are part of Russian institutions, they should be reflected in the 
structure of Russian production. 
Economic theory also underscores the ambiguity of this issue. In an economy dominated by 
monopolistic structures, the distribution of rents/profits is the outcome of a bargaining process, the 
results of which depend upon time and circumstances. Thus, in the Russian economic environment of 
the period 1990 to present, virtually any distributional result is possible, based purely on economic 
considerations. 
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Figure A2-3: Export margin payments, total margin payments and reported trade and transport  
margins, 1991 and 2000
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For these reasons, and until further detailed studies of the above issues are completed, we 
should continue to use the official Goskomstat statistics to represent the “true” structure of the Russian 
economy. 
 
